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Black Balance of Power in a Metropolitan 
Southern County: Fact or Fancy? 
WINFIELD H. RosE 
East Texas State University 
In a recent study Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn suggest a list 
of conditions that minority groups must fulfill to maximize their politi-
cal strength. 1 Among these are " ... the acquisition of political experi-
ence, the development of seasoned political leaders, the protection of 
legal safeguards , and a willingness to engage in a gradual rather than 
swift capture of political influence .... " 2 In the same vein, Feagin and 
Hahn also suggest that the rules of a democratic political system predi-
cate that there be: " ( 1) a large number of minority voters; ( 2) high 
voter registration and turnout ; ( 3) nearly maximal cohesion or unanim-
ity in the choice of candidates; and ( 4) a divided vote among majority 
electors." 3 Moreover, in an electorate where a minority comprises a 
sizable proportion of the total but lacks, by definition, a majority, it is 
clear that its chances of electoral success on questions that seriously 
divide the electorate are greatest when it effectively exercises a balance 
of power at the polls. 
This study will examine the electoral behavior of Durham County, 
orth Carolina during the decade of the 1960's in the light of the cri-
teria posited by Feagin and Hahn and will observe: ( 1) what trends, 
if any, developed during that time; and (2) when and under what con-
ditions the black electorate successfully exercised a balance of power 
and thereby achieved the electoral results it desired. In so doing, the 
study will examine all elections for national office 1960-1970 inclusive, 
three gubernatorial elections , and ten county referenda. It will also 
examine County Commissioner balloting in 1968 and 1970 and the 
Durham city mayoral elections of 1971, elections in which black candi-
dates were on the ballot. 
1 Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn, "The Second Reconstruction: Black Political 
Strength in the South." Social Science Quarterly, LI (June, 1970), pp. 42-56. 
2 Ibid., p. 42. 
3 Ibid. 
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THE DURHAM COUNTY SETTING 
Durham County is located in the piedmont region of North Caro-
lina at the northeast end of an area known as the "piedmont crescent."• 
The county arose after the Civil War as the site of new industria l en-
terprises , those being tobacco and textiles.6 In addition to these and 
other industries , the county also is the site of Duke University and North 
Carolina Central University. The latter is state-supported and is a pre-
dominantly black institution. The black proportion of the county's pop-
ulation always has been considerable. In 1890 blacks comprised 33.8% 
of the total, in 1920 35%,° in 1960 32%,7 and in 1970 32.6%.8 
"Black capitalism" today is a fashionable phrase and is thought to 
be, at least in some quarters , relatively novel. In Durham, however, it 
has been practiced for decades, particularly in the fields of insuran ce 
and banking. In 1898 the North Carolina Mutual and Provident Asso-
ciation was founded, evolving in 1919 into the North Carolina Mutual 
Life Insurance Company. 9 In the intervening years the company pros-
pered and today it is generally considered the largest black-owne d busi-
ness in the United States. 10 Other black businesses include the Mechan-
ics and Farmers Bank and the Mutual Savings and Loan Association. 
The development and success of these black-owned business enter-
prises have had a distinct impact on Durham County as a whole as well 
as on its black citizens. Very importantly, .financially independent and 
secure middle and upper class blacks have emerged, along with the 
faculty of North Carolina Central University, to provide articulate and 
effective leadership for the black community. 
In their study of four southern communities, Matthews and Prothro 
analyzed black leadership in terms of two objectives: first, their ability 
to instill morale in and to gain wide consent from their followers and, 
second, their effectiveness in attaining group goals. Such leaders in 
their "Piedmont'' county, that is, Durham County, ranked highest on 
both measures . Perhaps this is because, as Matthews and Prothr o state, 
* Preston W. Edsall and J. Oliver Williams, "North Carolina: Bipartisan Para-
dox," Ch. 8 in William C. Havard, ed., The Changing Politics of the South. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972, pp. 366-423, esp. p. 400. 
6 William Kenneth Boyd, The Story of Durham: City of the New South. Dur-
ham: Duke University Press, 1927. 
a Boyd, p. 283. 
7 U. S. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960. 
Census Tracts. Final Report PHC ( 1 )-42 , 1961. Based on statistics contained in 
Table P-1, p. 14. 
8 U. S. Bureau of the Census. U. S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1970. 
Census Tracts. Final Report PHC ( 1 )-61, 1972. Based on statistics contained in 
Table P-1, p. 1. 
0 Boyd, pp. 286-88. 
10 William R. Keech, The Impact of Negro Voting: The Role of the Vote in 
the Quest for Equality . Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1968, p. 15. 
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"their feelings about the past and present of race relations are more 
nearly those of the Negro common man than is true in any other county" 
even though they are "by far the most socially and economically privi-
leged" of the four groups of black leaders studied. 11 
This effective and articulate black leadership emerged in political 
form as the Durham Committee for Negro Affairs, founded in 1935.12 
More will be said about this organization later, but at this point several 
comments are in order. First, the Committee provides clear-cut voting 
cues to black voters on candidates and referenda through endorsements. 
Second, it accordingly provides and distributes sample ballots to black 
voters as they arrive at the polling places on election day. Third, it 
stresses the importance of bloc voting and over the years has elevated 
this tactic to the status of a tradition. Fourth, the consequence has been 
a highly cohesive black vote in accordance with its stand. Keech found 
that in the period 1949---1967 the vote in the black precincts averaged 
91% in favor of the DCNA endorsee. 13 Fifth, the Committee also stresses 
registration and turnout but, as will subsequently be shown, its success 
in these efforts has not been as great as in achieving a high degree of 
cohesion among those blacks who do register and turn out to vote. 
Finally, with black voters comprising 27% of the Durham County elec-
torate, as they did in 1970, it is obvious they are a most important force 
to be reckoned with when running for office or promoting a referendum 
proposition. 
Often working hand-in-hand with the DCNA is The Carolina Times, 
a black weekly newspaper founded in 1919. In 1965 the newspaper had 
an average circulation of 23,716 copies.H The 1960 and 1970 censuses 
respectively reported the presence of 9,105 and 11,799 occupied black 
housing units in Durham County; 16 thus, it is quite plausible that the 
Times is regularly present in almost every black home in the county. 
In sum, Durham County blacks meet the general conditions posited 
by Feagin and Hahn. The Durham Committee for Negro Affairs, now 
in existence for 40 years, cons,titutes a seasoned and experienced politi-
cal vanguard for the black community. More importantly, its leadership 
is accepted, as Matthews and Prothro have affirmed, and it has a widely-
distributed community mouthpiece in the form of The Carolina Times . 
11 Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern 
Politics. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1966, pp. 197-99. Matthews and 
Prothro's "Urbania" and "Piedmont County" are, without doubt, Durham and Dur-
ham County respectively. This conclusion is shared by Keech, p. 18. 
12 Keech, p. 26. In 1972 the name was changed to the Durham Committee on 
the Affairs of Blacks. 
18 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
u William F. McCallister, ed., Ayer Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals, 
1965. Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and Son, Inc., p. 796. 
16 Final Reports PHC (1)-42 (1960) and PHC (1)-61 (1970), Tables H-3. 
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Being financially independent, this leadership is not dependent on white 
toleration or patronage and is not, therefore, subject to the threa t of 
white economic sanctions; indeed, the clienteles of the black businesses 
outlined above are almost entirely black. In sum, the analysis tha t fol-
lows essentially is an examination of the electoral effectiveness of the 
DCNA in the 1960's. 
Another contributing factor is the protection of legal safegua rds . 
As the late V. 0. Key pointed out in his classic study, North Carolina 
is different 16 and Durham County is part of that tradition. It has b een 
years since systematic and widespread efforts were made to stifle black 
participation in the political processes of Durham County.17 Moreover, 
Durham County was not one 28 North Carolina counties that came un-
der the jurisdiction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.18 
Finally, blacks have indeed been willing "to engage in a gradual 
rather than swift capture of political influence." The Durham Commit-
tee for Negro Affairs had been in existence for 10 years when, in 1945, 
the first black ran for the Durham city council . The first successful such 
candidacy did not occur until 1953. Beginning in 1963, blacks trie d to 
add a second seat on the council and succeeded in 1967, making two 
blacks on a council of 13.19 They did not run a candidate for the Board 
of County Commissioners until 1968 or for Mayor of Durham until 1971. 
POPULATION AND REGISTRATION CHANGES 1960-197 0 
Durham County's 1960 population of 111,995 increased to 132,681 
in 1970 for a gain of 18.5%. 20 The black population rose from 35,862 to 
43,239 for a gain of 20.6% but the black proportion of the total popu la-
tion rose a negligible 0.6% from 32.0% to 32.6%. At the same time the 
growth rate of the white population was somewhat less, rising from 
75,965 to 88,979 for a gain of 17.1%. 
In keeping with these trends ( or the lack thereof), the white and 
black proportions of the county electorate did not change significantly 
between 1960 and 1970. As Table 1 shows, the white proportion of th e 
16 Southern Politics in State and Nation . New York: Vintage Books, 1949, pp. 
205-10. 
11 Keech, p. 26. As a matter of fact, in 1970 a black was elected Chairman of 
the Durham County Board of Elections. For a study in stark contrast, see the ex-
amination of Forrest County, Mississippi by James W. Silver in Mississippi: The 
Closed Society, 2nd edition. New York: Harcourt , Brace, and World, 1966, pp . 
105-06. 
1s CongTessional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. XXIII, no. 12, March 19, 1965, 
p. 431. 
10 Keech, p . 47. 
20 These and subsequent population statistics are either taken from or are based 
on data in the respective census reports already cited, Tables P-1. 
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TABLE I. Registration 1960-1970 
1960 1970 Change 1960-1970 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
White 89843 76.2% 39280 72.8% - 563 - 1.4% 
Black 12439 23.8% 14568 27.0% +2129 +17.1% 
Total 52282 53848 +1566 + 3.0% 
electorate declined from 76.2% to 72.8% while the black rose from 23.8% 
to 27.0%. In the same vein, Table 1 also shows that total registration rose 
by 1,566 or 3.0%, that white registration declined by 563 or 1.4%, and 
that black registration rose by 2,129 for a gain of 17.1%.21 
Interpreted, however, in terms of the percentage of voting age per-
sons registered, both whites and blacks lost ground between 1960 and 
1970. 22 The increase in black registration did not keep pace with the 
increase in black VA.P's and the proportion consequently declined from 
63.4% to 62.7%, as indicated in Table 2. The white percentage of VAP's 
registered, however, dropped even more markedly, from 84.2% to 
73.8%.29 
Table 2 also shows that the percentage of white VA.P's registered 
exceeded that of blacks in both 1960 and 1970 but that the margin by 
which the white percentage eXcceeded the black decreased during the 
decade, declining from 20.8 to 11.1 percentage points. Thus, even 
21 In 1970 Durham County computerized its registration system and it became 
possible to group voters by race and precinct. For years the County has had six 
clearly identifiable black precincts which, in 1970, were, in sum, 96% black and 
which contained 18% of the total county electorate. Since the total electorate was 
27% black that same year, the black precincts should have contained approximately 
two-thirds of the total black electorate. Using the 1970 data, the sum of the black 
registrations for the six precincts is 9,672. Multiplying this by 1.5 yields 14,508 for 
the county-wide total. The computer listed 14,568 registered blacks, indicating the 
extrapolation was in error by only 60 persons or 0.4%. Prior to 1970, breaking the 
electoral data down by race was impossible. The 1960 data used in this study were, 
therefore, obtained by using the process just outlined. Using data published in the 
May 28, 1960 edition of the Durham Morning Herald, p. 6-A, the total registration 
for the same six black precincts was 8,293. Multiplying this by 1.5 yields 12,439 for 
t):ie county-wide black total. At the same time, total registration was listed as 52,282. 
Subtracting 12,439 then gives 39,843 for the white total. 
I am grateful to Mrs. Anna Meyer, clerk of the Durham County Board of 
Elections, for making the 1970 registration data and much of the electoral data used 
in this study available to me. 
22 The numbers of white and black voting age persons ( 21 +) in 1960 and 1970 
were computed from data given in the respective census reports cited above, Table 
P-2, p. 17 for 1960 and Table P-5, p. 25 for 1970. 
23 I am aware that 1960 registration data for the county are presented in U. S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, Report, vol. I, Voting, Washington, D. C.: U. S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1961, pp. 278-79. I was, however, unable to establish the 
source of these data and felt compelled not to use them in this study because of 
questionable validity. For example, the report indicated that 98.1% of voting age 
whites were registered. Other statistics seemed somewhat more accurate but I chose 
to rely on my own computations throughout. 
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TABLE 2. Voting Age Persons Registered 1960-1970 
1960 1970 
Number Number Number Number 
VAP Registered Percent VAP Registered Percent 
Entire County 66930 52282 78.1% 76328 53,848 70.5% 
Whites 47296 39843 84.2% 53104 39,208 73.8% 
Blacks 19634 12439 63.4% 23224 14,568 62.7% 
Margin of White 
over Black 20.8% 11.1% 
though the white majority remains sizable in terms of both the total 
county population and the county electorate, blacks did gain ground in 
their potential electoral sb·ength over the decade from 1960 to 1970, 
but this gain resulted not from an increased rate of registration on their 
part but from a decreased rate of registration on the part of whites . It 
is true, then, that Durham County blacks, in spite of the efforts of the 
Durham Committee for Negro Affairs, are sacrificing a portion of their 
electoral potential simply by not registering at rates comparable to those 
of whites. 
TURNOUT AND VOTI G 1960-1970 
Six of Durham County's 38 voting precincts are predomina ntly 
black. 24 Combined, they were 96% black and 4% white in 1970. The 
following analys,is represents a comparison of turnout rates in the six 
black precincts and in the remaining 32 white precincts. 26 In all cases 
the total registration base was the current figure for that time, varying 
from election to election. 
Let us first examine turnout in general elections. In North Carolina 
gubernatorial elections coincide with Presidential elections and Table 3 
shows that in those three instances the turnout of the two groups was 
virtually equal. In the three remaining "off-year" elections, however, the 
white and black turnout rates were virtually equal only in 1962 with 
whites exceeding blacks by a fairly sizable margin in 1966 and 1970. 
The five County Commissioners are elected at-large in the Novem-
ber general elections also. In 1968 two blacks were on the ballot and 
in 1970 one. Their presence does not seem to have motivated blacks t.o 
tum out in greater numbers to support them. Indeed, black turnout 
24 They are f.recincts No. IO-Whitted School, No. 11-Hillside School, No. 12 
-Pearson Schoo, No. 13--Burton School, No. 17-Fuller School, and No. 34-
Pearsontown School No. 2. 
26 The registration data for the 32 white precincts revealed them to be, in sum, 
88% white and 12% black. I am aware that the presence of black voters in these 
precincts dilutes the purity of these data as indicators of white turnout but since 
only relative comparisons need be made here these voters are not factored out. At 
the subsequent stage of the analysis dealing with balance of power, greater precise-
ness is called for and a correction factor will be introduced. 
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TABLE 3. Turnout in General Elections 1960-1970 
White Black 
1960 .... · · · · · · · · · · 64.9% 
1962 ........... . ... 41.3% 
1964 ................ 80.7% 
62.0% 
41.9% 
80.4% 
White 
1966 ... . ............ 50.5% 
1968 .............. 83.2% 
1970 ... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.3% 
Bl,ack 
40.0% 
83.7% 
36.2% 
actually was less in 1970 than in 1966 or 1962 when no black candidates 
were running. And, since white and black turnout rates were virtually 
equal in 1960 and 1964 as well as in 1968, it would seem that national 
and state balloting are the primary attraction rather than the presence 
of black candidates for local office. 
In the same vein, a black was running for mayor of Durham in the 
municipal elections of 1971. In the primary, white turnout was 21.2% 
while the black was 23.7%. The general election amounted to a runoff 
between the black candidate and a white opponent. White turnout in 
this instance was 40.8% while blacks turned out at the rate of 41.3%. In 
these two municipal elections, then, the black turnout rate exceeded the 
white but onJy by a small fraction. In sum, the presence of black candi-
dates on the ballot does not seem to induce blacks to tum out to vote 
at rates higher than those of whites. They behave similarly to voters 
across the country in that P,residential and gubernatorial elections have 
the greatest attraction for them. As long as this pattern prevails, then, 
it would seem that blacks are sacrificing potential political strength in 
at least two ways: (1) being a pre-determined minority, they need to 
turn out at rates significantly higher than those of whites, and ( 2) the 
failure of blacks to tum out in greater proportions when black candi-
dates are running may constitute a rather effective discouragement to 
prospective black candidates in the future. 
Let us now tum to turnout in the ten county referenda of the 
decade by examining Tables 4 and 5. Three of the referenda, the 1966 
hospital bonds and the hospital and airport bonds of 1968, coincided 
TABLE 4. Turnout in County Referenda 1960-1970 
White 
1960 school bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.8% 
1961 metro charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84.3% 
1964 school bonds O ..•••••.•••. • •.••.••.••. • .•..•.••.••• 66.7% 
1966 hospital bonds " ........................... . ........ 50.5% 
1968 school bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.9% 
1968 library bonds and permissive levy ............ . ..... . .. . 24.1% 
1968 hosttal and airport bonds O • • • • • • • • • • • . • • . • . • • . • • • • • • 83.2% 
1969 1% ocal option sales tax .......... .. .. . ... .. ... .... .. 28.4% 
Bl,ack 
26.7% 
16.8% 
65.4% 
40.0% 
17.0% 
12.2% 
83.7% 
15.9% 
When the ·referendum coincided with a general election or with a primary, total 
reported turnout was used ( " ) . In other instances turnout was computed by adding 
the positive and negative votes. 
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TABLE 5. Voting Rates in Referenda that are Concurrent with General or Primary 
Elections 
White Black 
' ;: J ~ -5 I: t: ·" ... ~ 
~-5° t ~l § 
~o ... ~e ~ 13> ~ ~> <I) <I) 
E-<,3i!: i:c; E-< ~ I: i:c; 
-1 ~ <I) .... 's§~ 
.e~ C ~ -~ ~
"t:°tl ~ .... 'IS ;: 
~? ~~ t ..,. C <I)~ ... 
~E ~ <I) ti::) .. ti""'- i:..i,:; \,_~~ i:..i~ Q., g~ 
.. ~ 5.i:: 0 
" 
0 0 0 
May 1964 
School Bonds 56.8% 37.9% 31.6% 20.7% 
November 1966 
Hospital Bonds 85.3% 43.0% 68.0% 27.2% 
November 1968 
Hospital Bonds 74.3% 61.8% 55.7% 46.6% 
November 1968 
Airport Bonds 71.4% 59.4% 49.2% 41.2% 
° Computed by dividing the sum of positive and negative votes by total reported 
turnout. 
°" Computed by dividing the sum of positive and negative votes by the total regis-
tration figure for that time. 
with a November general election and a fourth, the 1964 school bonds, 
coincided with the May Democratic gubernatorial primary, a primary 
that culminated a particularly vigorous campaign. 26 Since the H:}68 hos-
pital and airport referenda were concurrent , three rather than four sets 
of turnout are at issue here and Table 4 shows that in two instances 
( 1964 and 1968) white and black turnout were virtu ally equal while 
in the third ( 1966) white exceeded black by 10.5 percentage points. 
However, these observations are misleading because not all voters who 
voted in the general elections or in the primary voted in the referenda 
held along with them. Table 5 shows this to be true in both the white 
and black precincts but much more so in the black. For these four 
referenda the average white effective turnout was 50.5% while the black 
was 33.9%. Thus, there are voters in both groups who vote in the gen-
eral election but do not vote in the referendum held at the same time. 
This problem is worse among blacks than whites and thereby weakens 
the voice of blacks in such referenda . 
Of the six remaining referenda , those which did not coincide with 
a general or primary election, five sets of turnout are at issue because 
the library bonds and permissive levy referenda of 1968 were concur-
26 See Edsall and Williams , pp. 387-89. 
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rent. These referenda occurred at "odd" times like January or March 21 
and Table 4 shows that in four of the five cases the black turnout rate 
was roughly half that of whites while in the remaining instance ( 1960 
school bonds) black turnout exceeded white by 3.9 percentage points. 
Put another way, for these five sets of turnout the white average is 
27.7% while the black is 17.7%. 
It is obvious, then , that general and primary elections have a 
"pulling" effect in that voting participation in referenda that coincide 
with them exceeds that in referenda which occur as special elections. 
For both the white and black precincts the ratio of the former to the 
latter is approximately two to one. It also is obvious that in both types 
of referenda the white turnout rate exceeds the black by a significant 
margin. In sum, we see again that Durham County blacks have sacri-
ficed electoral potential, in these instances simply by not voting at rates 
comparable to those of whites. 
Let us now turn to referendum voting in the decade from 1960 to 
1970 by examining Table 6. We already have observed that the regis-
tration statistics of the six predominantly black precincts revealed them 
to be 96% black and 4% white in 1970 and that blacks comprised 27% 
of the total county electorate that same year. The six black precincts , 
however , contained only 18% of the total county electorate and we may 
oonclude, then , that they contain approximately two-third's of the total 
TABLE 6. Effect of Black Vote on Referendum Outcome 
Countywide Vote in the Vote in the Revised 
Referendum vote Black precincts White precincts white vote 
1960 school bonds 67.3%+ 18.1%+ 78.2%+ 86.3%+ 
32.7%- 81.9%- 21.8%- 13.7%-
1961 metro charter 22.2%+ 13.9%+ 23.2%+ 24.4%+ 
77.8%- 86.1%- 76.8%- 75.6%-
1964 school bonds 51.5%+ 23.3%+ 55.6%+ 60.4%+ 
48.5%- 76.8%- 44.4%- 39.6%-
1966 hospital bonds 37.0%+ 12.5%+ 41.2%+ 45.1%+ 
63.0%- 87.5%- 58.8%- 54.9%-
1968 school bonds 44.6%+ 19.8%+ 47.4%+ 51.2%+ 
55.4%- 80.2%- 52.6%- 48.8%-
1968 library bonds 43.1%+ 74.1%+ 39.1%+ 34.3%+ 
56.9%- 25.9%- 60.9%- 65.7%-
1968 library levy 39.2%+ 68.7%+ 35.3%+ 30.8%+ 
60.8%- 31.3%- 64.7%- 69.2%-
1968 hospital bonds 64.4%+ 87.3%+ 60.7%+ 57.1%+ 
35.6%- 12.7%- 39.3%- 42.9%-
1968 airport bonds 47.1%+ 79.8%+ 42.3%+ 37.1%+ 
52.9%- 20.2%- 57.7%- 62.9%-
1969 sales tax 60.3%+ 31.4%+ 63.7%+ 68.2%+ 
39.7%- 68.6%- 36.3%- 31.8%-
. 
27 The 1% local o_ption sales tax referendum occurred in November of 1969 but 
smoe 1969 was an odd year no other elections were held at that time. 
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black electorate. This is reflect ed in the fact that the registration data 
of the 32 white precincts reveal them to be 88% white and 12% black. 
Testing of the effectiveness of the black electorate in terms of pos-
sible balance of power , consequently , will be based on the assump tion 
that blacks in the white precincts voted in the same proportions for and 
against the propositions ,as did those in the six black precincts. For each 
referendum , then , Table 6 contains four sets of data. The first is the 
total county-wide vote. The second is the vote of the six black precin cts. 
The third is the vote of the 32 white precincts not corrected for the 
possible 12% black vote in them. Finally, the fourth is the re-calcul ated 
vote of the white precincts with the black vote in them removed accord-
ing to the assumption outlined above. 28 
From Table 6 several observations can be made. First, we may 
observe that , county-wide, four referenda resulted in approval of the 
proposition while six did not. 29 However , no stark trends across the 
decade are apparent: victories were won in 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1969 
but one proposition went down to defeat in 1961 and 1966 and four in 
1968. 
The black precincts took a decidedly more positive view, however, 
toward the end of the decade. They supported only four of the ten 
propositions and all four of them were voted on in 1968. This change, 
however, resulted more from the substantive content and potenti al im-
pact of the propositions than from an emergent positive tendency on the 
part of blacks per se. 30 
We may also observe that the Durham Committee for Negro Af-
fairs was successful in achieving a highly cohesive vote in the black 
precincts. Cohesion ranged from a low of the 68.6% vote against the 
1969 1 % local option sales tax to a high of the 87.5% vote against the 
28 To illustrate this process I will use data from the 1969 sales tax referendum. 
Table 6 + Total 
County-Wide 
6 Black Precincts 
32 White Precincts 
Number Percent Number Percent 
8651 
486 
8165 
60.3 
31.4 
63.7 
5706 
1063 
4643 
39.7 
68.6 
36.3 
14357 
1549 
12808 
According to the assumptions outlined in the text, 12% or 1537 of the 12,808 
votes cast in the 32 white precincts were cast by blacks. Computing 31.4% of 1537 
yields 483 black positive votes and 68.6% of 1537 yields 1054 black negative votes. 
Subtracting 483 from 8165 gives 7682 white positive votes and 1054 from 4643 
leaves 3589 white negative votes or 11,271 white votes all together, of which 7682 
is 68.2% and 3589 is 31.8%. 
29 Only a simple majority is needed for approval. 
30 See Keech, ch. IV and Winfield H. Rose, Referendum Voting and the Politics 
of Health Care in Durham County, North Carolina, unpublished Doctoral disserta-
tion, Duke University, 1973. In general , the question can be reduced to whethe r the 
proposition had racial overtones or implications. If it did, the blacks saw themselves 
as probable losers and, therefore, voted against it. 
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1966 hospital bonds and averaged 99.1 % on the whole. At the same 
time, they were slightly more cohesive in opposition than in support: 
the average of their six negative votes being 80.2% with that of their 
four positive votes 77.5%. 
In testing the effectiveness of the cohesive black bloc in terms of a 
possible balance of power two perspectives can be brought to bear on 
Table 6. The first centers on whether or not the blacks actually changed 
the outcome and the second on whether or not they could have changed 
the outcome if they had voted opposite to the way they did and at the 
same rate of cohesion. 
With respect to the 1960 school bonds and 1961 metropolitan charter 
referenda it is clear that the black bloc did not and could not have 
changed the final outcome because the white vote simply was too 
strong. Increased turnout and cohesion would have been of no avail. 
However, in the 1964 school bonds referendum the blacks almost de-
feated the proposition, their high negative vote bringing the total posi-
tive vote down to 51.5%. If they had voted oppositely they would simply 
have reinforced the white vote but if they had been more cohesive or if 
more blacks who voted in the primary had voted in the referendum at 
the same rate of cohesion they undoubtedly could have defeated the 
proposition by a narrow margin. 
In the 1966 hospital referendum blacks brought the 45.l % white 
positive vote down to 37.0%. Hence, they did not reverse the actual 
white vote but since the white vote was fairly evenly divided they could 
have changed the final outcome by voting positively as cohesively as 
they, in fact, voted negatively. If they had done so they would have 
overridden the white vote and made the total vote 55.5% in favor and 
44.5% opposed. Increased voting and cohesion would have increased 
black strength but would not have changed either the actual or hypo-
thetical final result that did or would have occurred, given their existent 
turnout and cohesion. In other words, existent turnout and cohesion 
were sufficient to achieve either result, depending on the direction of the 
vote. The same is true with regard to the 1968 hospital referendum in 
which blacks again voted in the same direction, in sum, as whites but 
much more strongly. They raised the white positive vote from 57.1% 
to a county-wide total of 64.4%. Again, if they bad voted negatively at 
the rate of 87.3% instead of positively they could have overridden the 
white favorable vote and defeated the proposition. In that case the 
total vote would have been 46.4% in favor and 53.6% against. 
In the case of the 1968 school bonds referendum the strong nega-
tive vote of the blacks easily overcame the feeble white majority and 
defeated the proposition. If ~e blacks had voted oppositely they 
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simply would have reinforced the white favorable vote and increa sed 
turnout and cohesion obviously would not have affected the final out-
come in either case. 
In the two 1968 library referenda the blacks supported the propo si-
tions but not well enough to overcome the strong white negative vote. 
If they had voted in the opposite direction they again would have 
reinforced the white vote. Howev er, in these instances the blacks again 
possessed a potential balance of power. Hypothetically speaking, if 
they had turned out to vote at the rate of 40% instead of 12.2% and if 
they had vnted for both propositions at the rate of 80% instead of 74.1% 
and 68.7% respectively, both of which are reasonable possibilities, they 
would have boosted the total county-wide vote to a slight majority in 
favor of the bonds and to 49.5% in favor of the permissive levy. 
Compared with the library referenda, in the airport referendum of 
1968 the white favorable vote was higher and the blacks were more 
cohesive. Consequently, the blacks more nearly approached success in 
that they raised the white positive vote of 37.1% to an overall 47.1%. In 
this case, however , effective turnout ( 41.2%) and cohesion (79.8%) 
exceeded or virtually equalled the levels hypothesized above but, given 
their actual rate of turnout , if the blacks had supported the airport bonds 
as cohesively as they did , in fact , support the hospital bonds , they would 
have raised the county-wide vote to 48.9% in favor. Thus , realistical ly 
speaking, in this instance blacks almost but did not quite possess a 
balance of power. 
The blacks opposed the 1969 sales tax and brought the white favor-
aible vote of 68.1 % down to 60.3%. If their turnout rate had been ,i0% 
instead of 15.9% and if they had voted against the proposition at the 
rate of 80% instead of 68.6% they would have lowered the final positive 
vote to 53.5%. Realistically speaking, in this instance , then, the blacks 
did not possess a balance of power. Finally , if the blacks had voted 
oppositely they would have reinforced the white vote rather than 
changed it. 
In sum, the blacks defeated one proposition ( 1968 school bonds) 
and could have changed the outcome of two others ( 1966 and 1968 
hospital bonds) by v,oting oppositely at the same rate of cohesion. In 
these instances, then , they did in fact possess a balance of power and 
they exercised it. In three other instances ( 1964 school bonds and 1968 
library bonds and levy) there was a realistic hypothetical possibility of 
their possessing a balance of power but they did not exercise it. Finally, 
in four referenda ( 1960 school bonds, 1961 metro charter, 1968 airport 
bonds , and 1969 sales tax) they did not possess and there was no real-
istic hypothetical possibility of their possess,ing a balanoe of power. 
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In conclusion, let us examine Table 6 for achieved preference by 
comparing columns two and four with column one. We may observe 
that the blacks saw their preference achieved in four of the ten ref-
erenda. They thwarted the white majority once ( 1968 school bonds) 
and majorities of both whites and blacks agreed three times ( 1961 
metro charter, 1966 and 1968 hospital bonds). Finally , the majority 
thwarted the black in the remaining six referenda. 
In partisan elections the blacks have been more successful in 
achieving their desired result, as Table 7 shows. Of 16 such elections 
we may observe that their preference was the county-wide preference 
on 15 occasions, the lone exception being the 1962 Senatorial contest. 31 
Whites, on the other band, were similarly successful only eight times. 
We already have observed that turnout was higher in general elec-
tions than in referenda. Table 7 shows that, in addition, the cohesion 
of the black vote in partisan elections is considerably higher than in 
referenda, the average of the former being 89.2% as opposed to 79.1 % 
among the latter. Moreover, in 15 of the 16 elections the blacks sup-
ported the Democratic candidate , their Democratic vote averaging 
87.9%. 
The white majority, on the other hand, supported the Democrait in 
the four Senatorial races and in the first four House races (but in 1966 
only by a small fraction). They supported the Republican in the House 
races of 1968 and 1970 and not once did they support the Democratic 
candidate for President or Governor. It is apparent, then, that the white 
majority supported the Democrat only when he was a traditional, South-
ern Democrat of the "old school." Otherwise, they supported the Re-
publicans or in the case of the 1968 Presidential election, George Wal-
lace by a plurality. In this instance, the combined Nixon-Wallace vote 
among whites totalled 82.9%. 
Assessing the impact of the cohesive black bloc in terms of a 
balance of power can be done more straightforwardly in the case of 
partisan elections than in referenda. From Table 7 it is clear that in all 
Presidential and Gubernatorial elections as well as in the 1968 and 1970 
U. S. House races the black bloc provided the Democratic candidate's 
winning margin in the county and in so doing possessed and exercised 
an effective balance of power. Moreover, in the 1966 House contest the 
white vote was so evenly divided that it again is clear that the blacks 
possessed a balance of power. In addition, the same is true of the 1964 
House race when the white vote was only 56.6% for Kornegay, the black 
vote was 96.4% for Kornegay , and black turnout was 80.4%. The only 
31 Senator Sam Ervin never enjoyed great popularity among Durham County 
blacks due to his stand on civil rights issues. 
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TABLE 7. Effect of Black Vote on Partisan Elections 
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Presidential 
1960: Kennedy (D) 57.4% 80.1% 52.0$ 48.2% 
Nixon (R) 42.6% 19.9$ 48.0$ 51.8$ 
1964: Johnson (D) 60.0$ 97.5% 49.5% 43.0$ 
Goldwater (R) 40.0% 2.5% 50.5% 57.0$ 
1968: Humphrey (D) 38.6% 95.5% 26.5% 17.1% 
Nixon (R) 29.6% 2.9$ 35.4% 39.9$ 
Wallace (AI) 31.6% 1.6$ 38.0$ 43.0$ 
U. S. Senate 
1960: Jordan (D) 71.6% 84.6$ 68.5% 66.3% 
Hayes (R) 28.4$ 15.4% 31.5% 33.7% 
1962: Ervin ( D) 68.6% 39.2% 73.3% 77.9$ 
Greene (R) 31.4% 60.8$ 27.7% 22.1% 
1966: Jordan (D) 69.5% 94.6$ 64.6$ 60.1% 
Shallcross (R) 30.5% 5.4% 35.4$ 39.9$ 
1968: Ervin (D) 64.4% 91.5% 61.6$ 57.5% 
Somers (R) 35.6% 8.5% 38.4$ 42.5% 
U. S. House 
1960. Kornegay ( D) 70.3% 83.6$ 67.3% 65.2% 
Robb (R) 29.7% 16.4% 32.7% 34 .8$ 
1962: Kornegay (D) 74.4% 86.4% 71.4% 69.3% 
Robinson ( R) 25.6$ 13.6$ 28.6$ 30.7% 
1964: Kornegay (D) 68.5% 96.4$ 61.4% 56.6% 
Green (R) 31.5% 3.6$ 58.6% 43.4% 
1966: Galifianakis ( D) 61.9$ 94.3% 55.7% 50.5% 
Steele (R) 38.1% 5.7$ 44.3% 49.5% 
1968: Galillanakis (D) 54.7% 95.5% 46.9$ 40.2% 
Steele (R) 45.3% 4.5% 53 .1% 59.8% 
1970: Galillanakis ( D) 54.8$ 95.9$ 47.9$ 41.3% 
Hawke (R) 45.2% 4.1% 52.1% 58.7% 
Governor of North Carolina 
1960: Sanford (D) 54.5% 82.4$ 48.1% 43.4% 
Gavin (R) 45.5% 17.6% 51.9$ 56.6% 
1964: Moore (D) 56.5% 91.2% 47.5% 41.6% 
Gavin (R) 43.5% 8.8% 52.5% 58.4% 
1968: Scott (D) 54.4% 97.5% 45.7% 38.6$ 
Gardner (R) 45.6$ 2.5% 54.3% 61.4% 
instance in which blacks clearly did not possess a balance of power was 
in the 1962 Senatorial election. 
It remains for us to examine the three remaining Senate races and 
the two remaining House races. In each of these five cases black tum -
BLACK BALANCE OF POWER IN A METROPOLITAN SOUTHERN COUNTY 135 
out and cohesion equalled or exceeded the levels hypothesized in the 
referenda analyses presented earlier. Consequently, we now will exam-
ine only the results that would have occurred if the blacks had voted 
exactly opposite to what they did but at their given rates of cohesion 
and turnout. Table 8 reveals that in only two of these five elections did 
the black electorate possess a balance of power. In sum, in 12 of the 
16 or 75% of the partisan elections under examination the cohesive black 
bloc possessed and exercised a balance of power in that without their 
vote the candidate preferred by the blacks would not have carried the 
county. 
We may also observe from Tables 7 and 8 that the lowest white 
Democratic vote when the blacks were not a balance of power was 
65.2% ( 1960 U. S. House) and that the highest white Democratic vote 
when the blacks were a balance of power was 60.1% (1966 U.S. Senate). 
Thus, with some variation due to cohesion and turnout, we can say that 
the point at which cohesion of the white vote renders a black balance 
of power impossible lies between these parameters. Table 6 reveals the 
comparable interval in referendum voting, 62.9% ( 1968 airport bonds) 
to 57.1 % ( 1968 hospital bonds). That the boundaries of the latter in-
terval are lower than those of the former is, of course, due to the already-
observed lower black turnout and cohesion in referenda. In other 
TABLE 8. Selected Elections with Black Vote Reversed 
1960 U. S. Senate 
1966 U. S. Senate 
1968 U. S. Senate 
1960 U. S. House 
1962 U. S. House 
Actual 
Countywide 
Democratic Vote 
71.6% 
69.5% 
64.4% 
70.3% 
74.4% 
Democratic Vote 
if Black Vote 
Hai/Be en Reversed 
51.6% 
45.8% 
47.5% 
51.4% 
52.7% 
words, lower black turnout and cohesion in referenda permit the white 
electorate to be slightly less cohesive and still hold sway. On the other 
hand, the blacks were able to exercise an effective balance of power 
more often in partisan elections than in referenda because their cohesion 
and turnout were higher and because the white vote was more evenly 
divided. 
The final question that this study will examine is the effectiveness 
of the black bloc in electing black candidates for positions on the 
County Board of Commissioners and for mayor of the city of Durham. 
~ alluded to earlier, in 1968 two blacks were on the Commissioners' 
ballot. They were Asa T. Spaulding, retired president of the North Car-
olina Mutual Life Insurance Company, and J. C. Scarborough. Both, 
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of course, were endorsed by the Durham Committee for Negro Affairs 
and The Carolina Times. The black precincts voted 82.9% for Spauld-
ing and gave him 32.1 % of his total vote. At the same time, they voted 
86.9% for Scarborough and gave him 40.5% of his total vote. Neverthe-
less, Spaulding was elected and actually led the ticket whereas Scar-
borough came in sixth and consequently lost. The highest perce ntage 
of total vote that the black precincts gave any other candidate was 
15.3%; thus, a considerable amount of "single-shot" 82 voting for the 
black candidates occurred. Single-shot voting, however, obviously is not 
enough to elect blacks. Even though he received fewer black votes th an 
Scarborough, Spaulding led the ticket and won because he obviously was 
able to attract more votes from the white electorate than Scarbor ough . 
In 1970 Spaulding was the only black to make the race. The bl ack 
precincts supported him at the rate of 83.9%, gave him 23.5% of his 
total vote, and he came in second. Being an incumbent Democrat whose 
victory was virtually certain, single-shot voting was not as necessa ry as 
it had been in 1968 and the blacks supported the other four Dem ocrats, 
all of whom won, at rates almost as high as that for Spaulding. 
In 1971 Spaulding decided to run for mayor of Durham, the in-
cum bent white mayor, R. W. Grabarek, having announced his decision 
not to seek re-election. He was opposed in the primary by two whi tes. 
The results of that primary are given in Table 9.38 The table shows that 
Hawkins' support was virtually entirely white whereas Spaulding con-
tinued to attract biracial vote. 
TABLE 9. 1971 Municipal Primary Election 
Direction of 
Black Vote 
Spaulding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92.1% 
Jacobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4% 
Hawkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7$ 
Percent of 
Total Vote 
Contributed 
by Black 
Precincts 
38.9% 
9.6$ 
2.0% 
Division of 
Total Vote 
48.7% 
3.0% 
48.3% 
Since no candidate received a majority, Spaulding and Hawkin s 
faced each other in the general election two weeks later in which Haw-
kins defeated Spaulding 54.9% to 45.1 %. The distinction of being the 
6rst black elected mayor of a major southern city was thus left to May-
nard Jackson in Atlanta. 
82 See Keech, p. 32. 
8 3 Five of the six black precincts lies within the city limits of Durham, No. 34 
being the exception. This analysis is, therefore, based on the behavior of these five 
precincts. 
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In this election the black precincts supported Spaulding at the rate 
of 93.6% and gave him 39.3% of his total vote. Comparable rates for 
Hawkins were 5.2% and 1.8% respectively and it is plausible that these 
votes ( 154 all together) were cast by the handful of whites who lived 
in the black precincts. We see again, then, that Spaulding's support was 
biracial whereas Hawkins' was not. 
In one sense it was, of course, the power of sheer numbers that 
defeated Spaulding. We already have observed that in the primary 
white turnout was 21.2% while the black was 23.7% and that in the 
general election white turnout was 40.8% while the black was 41.3%. 
Thus, black turnout increased by 17.6 percentage points whereas white 
rose by 19.6%. Moreover, 40.8% of the white electorate obviously is a 
larger absolute number than 41.3% of the black, as Hawkins' final vote 
amply demonstrates: his vote rose by 114.5% while Spaulding's rose by 
only 75.2%. Thus, it would seem that a number of whites were willing 
to support a black as one of five members of the Board of County Com-
missioners but were not willing to accept him as the city's elected execu-
tive. Nevertheless, approximately 60% of Spaulding's final vote came 
from white precincts, a faot that speaks well for both him and for the 
city's white voters. 
In another sense it was, however, the failure of the blacks to exer-
cise a balance of power that defeated Spaulding because they, in fact, 
possessed such a potential. The obvious point that blacks must tum 
out to vote at rates higher than whites in order to maximize their elec-
toral potential already has been made and Spaulding's defeat in 1971 ~ 
an example of what results when they fail to do so. Hypothetically 
speaking, if the behavior of the white electorate had remained un-
changed and if black cohesion had remaiined 93.6% for Spaulding, a 
black turnout rate of 66.9% would have made Spaulding the victor. 
In sum, we already have observed that the presence of black candi-
dates on the ballot does not induce blacks to tum out to vote at rates 
appreciably higher than whites. Moreover, the experience of the elec-
tions just analyzed shows that: ( 1) Blacks who do turn out and vote 
support the black candidate at high rates of cohesion and contribute an 
indispensable portion of his total vote. ( 2) A black candidate cannot 
win without a considerable amount of white support. In 1968 Spauld-
ing was able to gamer such support: but Scarborough was not. ( 3) It is 
easier for one black rather than two to be elected to a five-member 
board of county commissioners. 84 ( 4) Even though Spaulding received 
34 In 1968 when Spaulding and Scarborough were two of the five Democratic 
nominees a Republican was elected. In 1970, however, when there was only one 
black Democratic nominee, the Republican was defeated for re-election by a white 
newcomer. 
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white support in every instance, the total white electorate seems willing 
to accept one black among five county commissioners and two among 
13 city councilmen but, at the same time, is not willing to accep t a 
black as the city's single executive officer. And finally, (5) be that as 
it may, the blacks possibly could capitalize on white voter apathy and 
elect such an official if they were not as apathetic themselves. 
SUMMARY AND CO CLUSIO S 
After laying the theoretical groundwork and sketching the political 
culture of the area, this study has examined the electoral behavio r of 
Durham County, North Carilina in the 1960's with emphasis on assess-
ing the role of the black electorate in terms of a balance of power. At 
this point there is no need to recapitulate all of the findings made. 
Rather, it is sufficient simply to observe that a black balance of powe r is 
indeed a fact and not a fancy, in spite of the fact that blacks do not 
register and turn out to vote at rates comparable to those of whi tes, 
when and/or because blacks vote at high rates of cohesion whereas the 
white electorate divides itself more evenly. For the former the Durham 
Committee for Negro Affairs undoubtedly is responsible; for the latter 
it, no doubt, is thankful. Yet, the black balance of power that exists 
occurs more often in state and national elections, when Durham County 
obviously is not the total electorate, and less often in local elections 
and referenda. Thus, its policy impact is limited on both fronts. 86 
The fact remains, however, that in elections such as local referenda 
the blacks are a force to be reckoned with. While they could strength en 
their position through increased regisb·ation and turnout, they did pos-
sess or could have possessed a balance of power in six of the ten such 
elections examined in this study. The process by which white political 
leaders have come to terms with this has been slow and painful but 
they have come to terms with it. The DC A has thus become able to 
bargain with the "establishment" because the establishment knows that 
while black support does not ensure victory, black opposition rende rs 
defeat much more likely. Moreover, black leaders have the advan tage 
over the white in that the black vote is more cohesive, manageable, and 
deliverable whereas the white vote is fragmented, uncertain, and un-
deliverable. Not knowing how much support they will actually receive 
from the white electorate, white leaders must accommodate the black 
perspective if they want the proposition they are putting forward to 
have a realistic chance of countywide approval. 86 
86 See Keech, Ch. IV, for an elaboration of this point. 
86 These conclusions are developed more fully in my dissertation, cited in foot-
note 30 above, and by Jeanne Fox in Regionalism and Minority Participation, Wash-
ington, D. C.: Joint Center for Political Studies, 1973, Chapter 2. 
